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Introduction 
Exports of inland and marine capture fish and fishery products (thereafter ‘fish’) are of 
integral importance to government revenues and income and employment generation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (thereafter ‘Africa’). African countries face complex negotiations at the 
WTO-level on tariffs and fishery subsidies, and bilateral and regional negotiations with the 
EU in the formulation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements (FPAs). In addition, they need to comply with increased food 
safety standards. The outcomes of WTO negotiations under the Doha ‘Development 
Round’ and changing EU regulations are likely to place new hurdles on African fish 
exporting countries. In this briefing, we analyse how these countries can respond to these 
challenges. 
Fish trade between Africa and the rest of the world is regulated via a complex overlap of 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. We focus here on aspects that affect market 
access and competitiveness of African fisheries exports to the EU, their main end-market. 
During the Uruguay Round, fisheries were left out of the Agreement on Agriculture at the 
insistence of some EU countries that benefited from the EU fisheries subsidy regime. As a 
result, fisheries-related issues are covered by various other agreements. Most notably, 
fisheries subsidies fall under the discipline of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM). The main areas up for negotiation in the Doha Round 
are tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions under the negotiating group on ‘Non-Agricultural 
Market Access’ (NAMA) and specific mention of a reduction of fisheries subsidies under 
the WTO negotiating ‘Group on Rules’. However, many other WTO-related issues have 
real or potential impact on market access opportunities for fisheries products from African 
countries, such as: (1) outcomes from the Dispute Settlement Mechanism; (2) the current 
process of clarification on the impact of eco-labels on trade; (3) the relation between trade 
rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs); (4) Technical Assistance and 
Capacity Building (TA & CB); and (5) provisions for Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT). 
As for the EU, the Cotonou Agreement applies to all African members that are part of the 
ACP group of countries. This agreement provides tariff-free access to the EU provided that 
fish exports comply with specific Rules of Origin (ROO). If ROO fail, then a country has to 
export to the EU under the higher Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff rates. ACP countries 
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claim that these rules are promoting rather than decreasing dependence on the EU. The 
EU modified its ROO in 2005. The new ROO for fisheries products, however, are not 
substantially different than the older ones and they do not address ACP countries’ 
demands for more liberal rules. For the time being, African ACP exports to the EU that 
qualify under Cotonou still have some degree of tariff preference over exports taking place 
under MFN rates. They also have (less marked) tariff preference over exports that qualify 
under the Generalised System of Preferences.  
The EU is seeking to replace the Cotonou Agreement with a series of WTO-compatible 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). However, the negotiation process in this realm 
has been very slow and the EU ‘vision’ of how EPAs might function remains opaque 
except for a fairly narrow emphasis on ‘the progressive removal of barriers to trade 
between the Parties’ (EC, 2000: Article 37.7). The ACP position on the Cotonou 
Agreement is more concerned with its potential developmental implications. In short, while 
Cotonou offers elements of the continuation of the preferential trade agreements 
embodied in the Lomé Conventions (although within a more limited and/or tenuous 
timeframe), in practice, by sub-dividing the ACP grouping into five new EPA sub-regional 
groupings, Cotonou substantially reduces the collective bargaining power of these 79 
countries. The replacement of bilateral fisheries agreements with Fisheries Partnership 
Agreements (FPAs) is linked to EPA negotiations. However, there is significant confusion 
in ACP negotiating forums over the distinctions between EPAs and FPAs. For example, 
EPAs are (on paper) ‘developmental’ arrangements, but FPAs are perceived by the EC 
Directorate of Fisheries as a commercial mechanism.  
The outcome of EPA and FPA negotiations is particularly important for non-LDC ACP 
countries because if they fail to reach such agreements from 2008 their preferences will 
fall under the GSP of the EU. Relying on GSP preferences is a volatile option, as it is 
gradually being phased out. While it seems likely that the full implementation of EPAs 
might extend beyond the 1 January 2008 deadline for non-LDC ACP countries, this will 
only entail a maximum of two additional years.  
The Everything-but-Arms (EBA) scheme is a unilateral offer of the EU to LDCs that is valid 
for an unspecified period of time. This also means that it can be withdrawn at any time. It 
allows tariff-free access to the EU, provided that they fulfil the appropriate ROO. Finally, 
the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) is a bilateral agreement 
between the EU and South Africa, which was signed in 1999. A bilateral fisheries 
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agreement was supposed to follow the TDCA, but negotiations have stalled, given South 
Africa’s refusal to allow EU vessels to fish in its territorial waters.   
Fisheries-relevant negotiations at the WTO 
WTO negotiations impacting fisheries sectors in Africa have taken place under various 
headings. The two main ones are: (1) tariff negotiations under NAMA (as noted above, fish 
are not covered by the Agreement on Agriculture); and (2) subsidy negotiations under the 
‘Negotiating Group on Rules’. The goal of the Doha Round in relation to tariffs is their 
negotiated reduction on a number of categories of goods, including fish and fishery 
products. In general terms, one of the central issues for African fish exporting countries is 
not to obtain lower tariffs in their principal export markets, but to avoid tariff preference 
erosion. A successful round of WTO negotiations on reducing or abolishing fishery tariffs 
under NAMA would therefore be highly problematic. An exception is South Africa, which 
currently faces MFN tariff rates in the EU and would thus benefit from fishery tariff 
reductions. Conversely, a status quo situation at the WTO level would conserve tariff 
preferences to the benefit of African LDCs, whereas the impact on non-LDC ACP fish 
exporters depends on the outcome of EPA negotiations with the EU – and even then their 
margin of tariff preference may still be eroded. 
As the fish sector is not subject to the Agreement on Agriculture, negotiations on subsidies 
are framed within the more rigorous disciplines of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Although ACSM made it possible to challenge (some) 
fisheries subsidies, no major reduction has taken place to date. Few WTO members have 
complied with their obligation to report subsidies to the ACSM. The ACSM also allows 
litigation through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). A positive outcome of a case 
brought to the DSB could have allowed the imposition of countervailing duties in other 
sectors. Yet, the DSB has not yet been used to challenge fisheries subsidies.  
Given the failure of member countries in using ASCM and the DSB to force reductions in 
fisheries subsidies, the focus has now moved towards a negotiated process. Fisheries 
subsidies were explicitly slated for reduction or elimination in the Trade and Environment 
section of the Doha Declaration (paragraph 31). The limited status of knowledge on 
fisheries subsidies and their impacts implies that WTO negotiations are taking place with 
at best a fragmented and contradictory knowledge on the issue. These negotiations have 
been taking place within the ‘Negotiating Group on Rules’ since 2002. Before the start of 
tralac Trade Brief  no. 5/2005  www.tralac.org 
 
4 
the Doha Round (November 2001), fishery subsidies had been discussed for about five 
years in the Committee on Trade and Environment, which is not a negotiating forum.  
A number of submissions have been made to the ‘Negotiating Group on Rules’. In 
simplified terms, these fall along two main positions. The first is held by a group known as 
‘Friends of Fish’ -- arguing that the existing provisions of the ACSM are not enough to 
regulate fisheries subsidies. Therefore, this group calls for a specific (and improved) 
discipline for fisheries subsidies within the WTO. An opposite position has been developed 
chiefly by Japan, Korea and Taiwan, arguing that there is no need for special treatment for 
fisheries subsidies within the WTO. Their initial refusal to negotiate on subsidies was later 
mitigated. In the early days of negotiation, the EU took a passive stance in the debate in 
view of the ongoing internal discussion on the reform is of its Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). In its submission of May 2003, however, it finally presented a proposal that was 
roughly in between the two other positions, but somewhat closer to the proposal of 
‘Friends of Fish’.  
By late 2004, the debate in the negotiations started focusing on a ‘traffic light’ system of 
subsidy classification and on clarifying what would go into various boxes – a debate that is 
still ongoing. Until very recently, the issue of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for 
developing countries had not arisen in the negotiations. A detailed submission by Brazil 
(April 2005) opened up the debate in this regard. African countries have remained 
generally passive in these debates and negotiations, despite the clear impact that they 
may have on some coastal states that have bilateral access agreements with the EU 
(particularly in West Africa and the African island states of the Western Indian Ocean).  
Reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP): Implications for Africa  
The EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was agreed by member states in January 1983 
with the intention of ensuring sustainability of fish stocks within EU waters. After more than 
20 years of operation, it can be safely concluded that is has failed to do so, primarily due 
to over-capacity in the EU fishing fleet (fuelled substantially through subsidies) and 
ineffective regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. As fish stocks are at critically low 
levels in EU waters, resulting in decreasing levels of landings, the EU is facing a growing 
supply deficit to meet its demand for fish. The supply deficit has been solved through the 
increased purchase of fish caught by non-EU vessels outside EU waters and by the rise in 
effort of EU fleets in distant water fisheries (particularly along the African coast).  
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The EU revised the CFP in 2002. Although most of the revisions can be related to internal 
fisheries policy issues for EU waters, some changes may have an important impact on 
African countries. The CFP is composed of four policy areas. The following discussion 
highlights, for each policy area, the changes and specific content that impact on African 
countries. 
• Conservation policy – The changes in the CFP under this area were primarily 
directed to cope with the problems affecting EU waters. However, the policy has now 
broadened from focusing only on EU waters to also cover waters outside the EU in which 
EU vessels operate. An important principle here is to ensure that all conservation 
measures are respected, both within and outside EU waters. Yet, it should be noted that 
this principle might not always be respected in practice.  
• Structural policy - The changes in this area were also related mainly to the 
European fishing industry, but have an indirect impact on African countries. The most 
important element is the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), which is a 
subsidy scheme. The new CFP tightened (and by the end of 2004 formally terminated) the 
mechanism relating to the setting up of joint enterprises between EU companies and 
companies in third countries. From 2002, it has no longer been possible to establish 
temporary joint ventures, and the support from FIFG generally declined in later years. The 
financial support to the EU fish processing industry has also been revised. It is less 
favourable and has moved the focus from increased efficiency to the promotion of, and 
search for, new markets and uses for fisheries products. 
• Market policy – The aims of the new market policy are to balance supply and 
demand, improve the competitiveness of the processing industry and ensure the 
availability of quality fish products at affordable prices for European consumers. From an 
African perspective, the common marketing standards and regimes for trade with non-
member countries are the most important elements here. Almost two thirds of EU imports 
are covered by special rules as a result of bilateral agreements or special provisions (e.g. 
Cotonou, GSP). 
• International policy – in the revised CFP, the international policy dimension has 
become more prominent. The intention is to move from ‘access agreements’ to Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements (FPAs) with third countries, particularly with developing coastal 
states. The FPAs are supposed, on the one hand, to protect the interests of the EU 
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distant-water fleet and, on the other hand, to promote sustainable fisheries in the waters of 
the partner concerned.  
Bilateral fisheries relations are the backbone of EU fisheries collaboration with ACP 
countries. As of mid-2005, the EU was part of 22 bilateral fisheries agreements of which 
16 were with African countries. In 2005, approximately 20% the EU fleet (in GRT terms) 
was fishing under bilateral fisheries agreements with ACP countries. The cost for the EU to 
enter these agreements was €145 million per annum in the late 1990s, which is paid to 
ACP countries as rent for obtaining fisheries access. This rent is supplemented by 
European fishing companies which paid an additional €30 million in access fees. The bulk 
of the fish caught under ACP-EU fishery agreements is shipped to the EU, where 
processing and marketing takes place. Furthermore, catches by the EU distant-water fleet 
are most likely to be grossly underestimated, as ACP countries have limited possibilities to 
control their activities.  
Despite the EU’s apparently sympathetic intentions, in reality it needs: (1) continued 
access to African waters to employ large, predominantly Spanish and French industrial 
fleets; and (2) a reliable supply for the EU fish processing industry in the form of raw 
material, as landings from EU waters are continuously shrinking. At the same time, African 
fish processors have a genuine interest in obtaining access to the large and potentially 
lucrative EU fish market – particularly in increasing their share of processed products 
rather than being a raw material provider to the EU processing industry.  
The challenge of establishing FPAs is thus to find means that can ensure a balanced 
solution to the potentially conflicting interests of EU and African countries. It should kept in 
mind that the development of FPAs needs to be seen in the context of the negotiation of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which will to a large degree set the framework 
for how FPAs can be elaborated. At the same time, there may initially be important 
contradictions between them – contradictions that might stem from the EU’s lack of 
transparency and openness in its negotiation platform.  
Non-tariff barriers, market access and competitiveness 
Apart from the unevenness of fisheries access agreements in particular, the new 
international trade regime in general, and the barriers to entry embodied in OECD country 
fisheries subsidies, African exporters also have to face tough food safety and traceability 
standards imposed by developed countries. This issue is particularly tricky in relation to 
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fisheries exports given their susceptibility to spoilage, heavy metals in the food chain (such 
as mercury and cadmium) and the need for a cold-chain for many types of products.  
The main legal framework regulating food safety measures at the multilateral level is the 
WTO SPS Agreement, which aims at ensuring that SPS measures do not place 
‘unnecessary barriers to trade’. In essence, the agreement recognizes the right for 
countries to protect human, animal and plant life/health through the application of 
standards, provided that they are based on sound science, that they are appropriate to the 
levels of risk incurred, and that they do not unjustifiably discriminate among different 
importing countries. Complaints against a country’s perceived discriminatory SPS 
measures can be brought to the DSB of the WTO.  A formal application for the 
establishment of a dispute panel is not the only option, however. Complaints and requests 
for clarification can also be brought to the SPS Committee for discussion and possible 
informal bilateral settlement.  However, African countries have rarely used these 
mechanisms. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) is also relevant to fisheries. It aims at 
ensuring that standards, regulations and analytical procedures for assessing conformity do 
not create unnecessary barriers to trade. The main case that has been brought to the DSB 
to date was the ‘sardine case’ – where Peru complained against EU labelling regulations 
on canned sardines requiring the indication of geographic origin to qualify the term 
‘sardine’ when it was not of the species Sardinella pilchardus. The Dispute Settlement 
Body ruling was in favour of Peru.  
In the present conjuncture, African countries do not seem to be inclined (or able) to use 
the WTO to address perceived discriminatory standards applied by developed countries. 
Even when these measures may not be considered discriminatory or excessive, African 
fisheries still face the problematic task of compliance. The problems faced are not only the 
level of expenditure, paperwork and skills necessary for exporters to assure compliance, 
but also the legal, personnel and financial requirements placed on African governments to 
establish regulatory frameworks at the domestic level to support compliance.  
The EU has institutionalised particularly challenging regulations in this respect. The basic 
framework for fisheries products was laid out in the EC Directive 91/493 of 1991. This 
directive deals with ‘the production and placing on the market of fishery products for 
human consumption’. It requires member states and third countries to put in place systems 
of inspection and control to ensure the safety of fisheries products, including the 
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implementation of Good Hygiene Practices (GHPs) and Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) systems. Other important regulations affecting African exports of 
fisheries products are EU Regulation 466/2001 setting the maximum limits for heavy 
metals in a number of species of fish and shellfish, and EU Regulation 2065/2001 on 
labelling information for fishery and aquaculture products. The EU is also developing a 
legal framework to regulate the development of ecolabels and voluntary certifications, and 
laying down guidelines for the monitoring of claims.  
Many EU fisheries-specific regulations have now been integrated within what is known as 
the new EU ‘hygiene package’ of regulations (see details in Appendix 1). These contain a 
bewildering array of rules and demands on the regulatory agencies and exporters in 
African countries, even without considering private standards on quality, packaging, 
processing, and the impact of eco-labelling on market access. Given the highly technical 
nature of compliance and the costs related to it, this is probably the area that will pose the 
most serious challenges for African exporters of fisheries products and their industries and 
governments.  
Conclusions and policy implications 
African fish exporting countries are facing challenging negotiations and new developments 
in many different guises. These range from WTO-level negotiations on tariffs and 
subsidies, to bilateral and regional negotiations with the EU in the formulation of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs), to 
increased food safety standards imposed on their exports both by government regulation 
and by private buyers. The limited capabilities of these countries, especially LDCs, to 
follow (let alone shape) the outcome of these processes requires external support, 
regional coordination, and prioritisation of effort.  
In general, African countries, both LDCs and non-LDCs, have very little direct interest in 
seeing NAMA tariff negotiations succeed. They already enjoy preferential market access to 
the EU and will see this preference eroded in the case of successful negotiations. Thus, if 
anything, they should use the possibility of NAMA success as a bargaining chip for 
concessions in other areas of negotiation. 
Despite the high level attention that Northern subsidies have attracted in development 
circles, especially in agriculture, we argue that this is not the area where the most 
dangerous challenges arise for African fisheries. The latest developments in fisheries 
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subsidy negotiations suggest that access fees for distant water fishing are likely to be 
considered ‘acceptable’ forms of subsidization, provided that certain rules are followed. 
Even if they are not followed, ‘back door’ WTO-compatible arrangements can be easily 
administered, such as Japan’s practice of providing aid that, on paper, is totally unrelated 
to fisheries access. At the same time, there are broader impacts of Northern subsidies that 
have repercussions in African countries: overfishing, overcapacity and oversupply, threats 
to artisanal/small-scale fishing, insufficient local landings for processing, and a dearth of 
fish in local markets. Yet, if well-managed, local landings from distant water fleets can 
progressively stimulate local processing industries and create employment, and by-catch 
can be used as a source of supply for local markets. 
In our view, the main area where African negotiating teams should focus for the time being 
is on EPA/FPA negotiations with the EU, and within these on instruments that would 
facilitate the matching of official and private food safety (and in the future, environmental) 
standards. The situation is particularly delicate for non-LDCs in relation to EPA/FPA 
negotiations as they will lose preferential access to the EU in 2008 under the terms of the 
Cotonou agreement. Still, even LDCs will be under a lot of pressure from the EU, as the 
EBA is a unilateral offer and can be withdrawn at will at any time. Also, cross-conditionality 
between EPA/FPA negotiations and bilateral aid is likely to continue, albeit in more hidden 
forms than previously. On the other hand, the EU is deeply concerned about finding 
sources of supply for its distant water fleets, its processing industry and its domestic 
markets more generally. This should give African countries more weight in EPA/FPA 
negotiations than ever before with the EU, especially if these agreements (or at least some 
of the basic principles underpinning them) are carried out in practice at the regional or sub-
regional levels. 
tralac Trade Brief  no. 5/2005  www.tralac.org 
 
10 
APPENDIX 1: EU FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
 
The new EU food safety and hygiene framework (‘hygiene package’) to be in force from 
2006 covers all foodstuff from farm-gate to retail (but some requirements are not applied to 
farms – e.g. HACCP). Special provisions/chapters/annexes apply to fisheries products, by 
and large coming from older fishery-specific regulations. 
The main features of the ‘hygiene package’ are: 
• Third countries need to have health and sanitary regulations that are at least 
equivalent to the ones required within the EU; 
• They need to have competent authorities that can guarantee effective implementation 
of the relevant regulations through inspection, monitoring and sanctioning systems; 
• Business operators need to apply specific sanitary and health practices in catching, 
handling, processing and packaging fish and fishery products, and a system of risk 
management based on HACCP. 
 
In the following paragraphs, the main features of individual regulations that make up the 
‘hygiene package’ are laid out. 
Regulation 178/2002 
• Framework regulation forming the basis of new legislation on food safety – 
establishing basic principles, setting up the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
• Sets guidelines for the establishment of a comprehensive system of traceability and 
recall/withdrawal (art. 18) 
o All food businesses need to maintain documentation of suppliers and buyers  
(‘one-step-back, one-step-forward’ system) for food and feed 
 Need to know the identity of suppliers/buyers (except for final consumers) and 
what item/batch has been bought/sold; 
 Need to have appropriate system and procedures in place 
o Risk management tool, does not make food any safer by itself 
o Regulation establishes principles and goals, not how to achieve them; leaves 
some degree of flexibility to food industry; but measures need to be designed to 
follow physical movement of product, not only commercial movement 
o Applies to ‘any substance intended to be, or expected to be, incorporated into 
food or feed’; does not apply to veterinary medicine, plant protection products, 
fertilizers, packaging (covered by other regulations) 
o Internal traceability needed to facilitate targeted and accurate withdrawals 
o Applies to all food business operators at all stages of the value chain, including 
primary producers and transporters 
o Applies from importer to retail levels in case of products coming from third 
countries (Art. 11) 
 Exporters are not legally required to fulfil traceability requirements, except in 
case of special bilateral agreements for sensitive sectors, or where there is a 
specific EC legal requirement 
 In practice, food businesses may require trading partners to provide 
traceability information all the way up the value chain in third countries – but 
this is a matter of contractual obligations, not EC regulation. 
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Regulation EC 852/2004 
• Sets general principles of food hygiene practices to be followed by all food 
businesses (except for primary producers) and places specific responsibility on them 
• Demands the application of HACCP 
• Demands registration and/or approval of food businesses with competent authorities 
• Does have an extra-territorial dimension (all imported foodstuffs have to comply with 
EC hygiene standards in their production, processing and handling) 
 
Regulation EC 853/2004 
• Sets specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin to be carried out by food 
businesses 
• In general, does not apply to primary producers; however, it does apply in the case of 
fisheries products 
• Implications for third countries: 
o Establishes a list system of third countries from which imports of products of 
animal origin are permitted (already in place for fisheries since 1998) 
o General guidelines for approval of third country 
 Legislation, quality of organization of competent authority, inspection 
 General animal health situation 
 Experience in exporting 
o Rules on inspection and audits to be done in a third country by the EU 
• Special provisions for fisheries products (Section VIII) 
o Equipment and hygiene conditions on vessels 
o Hygiene during and after landing 
o Hygiene rules for fresh, frozen, processed fisheries products 
o Health standards to be monitored and matched by fishery businesses 
o Rules on wrapping, packaging, storage and transport. 
 
Regulation EC 854/2004 
• Sets rules for official control of products of animal origin to be carried out by 
competent authorities (including in third countries) 
• Sets rules for approval of establishments by competent authorities 
• General provisions: audits of good hygiene practices (GHPs) and HACCP 
• Special provisions for fishery products (Annex III) 
o checks on hygiene conditions at landing and first point of sale 
o inspections of vessels, land-based establishments, storage and transport 
conditions 
o official controls for fishery products: 
 organoleptic examinations 
 freshness indicators 
 histamine 
 residues and contaminants 
 microbiological checks (‘where necessary’) 
 parasites. 
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Regulation EC 882/2004 
• Lays out EU’s duties in the organization of official food and feed controls, 
including rules to be applied by competent authorities 
• Provisions for the creation of third country lists 
o These countries have to undergo a compulsory EU audit and obtain a veterinary 
certificate 
o EU inspections can be carried out in non-member countries 
o Frequency of controls appropriate to the level of risk 
• Lays out rules to be followed by competent authorities 
o Operational criteria 
o Adequate staffing and equipment 
o Auditing of GHP, GMP and HACCP 
o Effectiveness 
o Impartiality 
o Contingency plans 
o Delegation to non-governmental bodies 
o Transparency 
o Sampling and analysis 
o Pre-export checks from non-member countries 
o Financing of official controls 
o Official and reference laboratories 
o Criteria for certification 
 
Other specific EU food safety regulations that affect fish and fishery products are: 
o EC Regulation 91/493 (and amendments) ‘Production and placing on the market of 
fishery products for human consumption’ – most provisions are now incorporated in 
‘general hygiene package 
 
o EU Regulation 466/2001 – sets the maximum limits for heavy metals in a number of 
species of fish and shellfish 
 
o EU Regulation 2065/2001 on labelling information of fishery and aquaculture products 
– requires the label to provide information on the trade name of the species, 
production methods (capture or aquaculture) and country of origin  
 
o EC Directive 96/23 – sets rules for controlling the residue levels of veterinary medicines 
(relevant for aquaculture). 
 
Finally, the EU is also developing a legal framework to regulate the development of 
ecolabels and voluntary certifications, and laying down guidelines for the monitoring of 
claims. 
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